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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
ADvust Pos:;tss10N-RAluoAD RIGHT ol!' WAY.-Defendant, by deed, ac-
quired. title to a r~ght of way, fifty feet wide and fenced within four feet of 
the line. Plaintiff owned the adjoining tract and more than ten years before 
thiS action was brought, planted fruit trees up to the fence. Held, the Sta-
tute of Limitations did not run against defendant as to the four foot strip. 
Beyer v. Chicago, R.1. & P.R. Co., (la. 1918), 169 N. W. 651. 
Th~ ~joriti, recognizing the conflict in the d~isions in other states, 
purports to decide in accordance with the. weight of authority in Iowa, notably 
the case of Barlow v. C. R. I. & P. R. Co.; 29 Ia. z;6 and also Slocumb v. C. 
B. &: Q. R. Co., 57 Ia. 67s. It erroneously cites the Barlow Case, supra, as au-
thority for the proposition "that. the Statute of Limitations does not apply 
where the easement was acquired by deed." In that case Barlow conveyed, 
to the defendant',s grantors by deed, subject to reversion, etc., the right of 
w.ay, at the time under cultivation. Later he conveyed to plaintiff who had no-
tice of the Company's claim and used the tract as had his predecessor. Held, 
that the Railway did not lose its right by nonuser. The Court says, "if the 
easement has been acquired by deed, no length of time of mere nonuser will 
operate to impair or defeat the right • • • In this case there was no use of 
the premises adverse. to the Defendant's right." No reference is made to 
conveyances by deed as exempt from the operation of the Statute. The 
plaintiff, having taken with notice, had by no overt act in change of use or 
otherwise, shown any intention to claim more than his grantor who held 
subject to the right of way. In this, it differs from the instant case where 
the Railway Company put up the fence and plaintiff and her predecessors, 
none of whom appear to have been the grantors of the Railway Company, 
cuitivated the land up to it. The difference in facts would easily warrant an 
assumption of acquiescence in the boundary line or adverse possession in the 
instant ease, while not in the Barlow Case. In Slocumb v. Railtvay Co., 
supra, plaintiff's deed "read "subject to any right of way" the Railway might 
own over the land.· In Ry. Co. v. Hanken, 140 Ia. 31z, it was held that the 
platting of dei>ot grounds had not fixed its boundaries which would then be 
determined by the location of the fence. In Ry. Co. v. Homan, 151 Ia. 404, 
it was a question of how much of the land had been accepted by the Railway. In 
Helmick v. Ry. Co., 174 Ia. 558, it was held that a railway company by ac-
quiescence in a fixed boundary line would be concluded thereby. None of 
these ~es deny the right to acquire right of way lands by adverse possession. 
on· anatogy·of the facts, the presetit case might better have been decided 
0
0n the 
authoritY of the Helmick Case rather than on that of the Barlow Case. The 
authorities in other jurisdictions are fu conflict. Some courts take the view 
that a railroad, enjoying the right of eminent domain, is quac;i-public and it 
is, therefore, contrary to public policy to subject it to the burden of adverse 
possession. Southern Pac. Co. v. Hyatt, 132 Cal. 240; Co11wrll v. Pliil. & R. 
R. Co. 241 Pa. 1;2; McLucas v. St. Joseph & G. I. K. Co., 67 Neb. 6o3. In 
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jurisdictions where the matter has been left with the courts independent of 
statute, the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the right. Chicago, 
etc. R. Co. v. Abbot, 215 Ill. <1t6; Northem Pac. R. Co. v. Taum.rmd, 84 Minn. 
152: see also 2 Va. L. Rev. 599- In "Vermont. New Hampshire, Massachu-
setts, North Carolina and Nebraska, statutes or other constitutional provis-
ions have declared railroads exempt from such burden. 
BAII.lf!R'l'S-1.n:N OF BAJI.!£.-Three late cases throW' light on recent de-
velopments in the law of lien. Tiu Gtllfport, 250 Fed. !J77, holding that a 
bailee who has performed services on a chattel ·does not lose his lien if he 
loses possession of the chattel through the act of God, and C"'cible Steel Co.· 
v. Polack Tyre & R11bber Co. (N. J. 1918) 104 Atl. 324 and Hilser v. Bitts 
(Oreg. 1918) 175 Pac. 133, both upholding statutory liens on chattels, not-
withstanding the bailee had parted with possession. The favor with which 
the law regarded the special lien has been well set forth by Gibson, C. J. in 
Stein"'°" v. Willtits.r,. 7 W. & S • .¢6, and by Bronson, J., in Grirmell v. Cook, 
3 Hill ..Ss. The limitations on the value of this right are well brought out 
by Shaw, C. J., in Doa11e v. RtU.rell, 3 Gray 382. These restrictions have pre-
vented the common law lien from keeping pace with the needs of a changing 
Jt'Orld, and as the courts, which had let in the lien without the aid oi statutes, 
refused to .remove these restrictions in the same way, the recent develop-
ment of the lien as a remedial instrument in the hand of the bailee has bad 
to depend upon statutes. ' 
The chief defects in the remedy of the lien were in the want of a power 
of sale and in the loss of lien by loss of possession. Possession is t.lte life 
of the lien and a lien cannot survive possession, said Ryan, C. J. in Snssm-
lwm11er v. Matthews, 48 Wis. 250. But in these days much beneficial labor 
is performed on property or chattels of a kind, or und~r circumstances, not 
permitting the bailee to have or to keep possession. . Hence the statutory lien 
on a house in favor of the builder and the material man. Hence, also, the 
statutory lien on the donkey engine in the Oregon case, ntra, for all the 
work done on the engine at various times under one contract, and in the New 
Jersey case, supra, the garageman's lien on the automobile for the price of 
the tires he had put on the machine. In this case the court held the statute 
not unconstitutional as depriving of his property without due process of iaw 
a third party who in ignorance of the lien had purchased. it. ·nou~tless a 
statute might be so framed as to do so, but this merely extended the coinmon-
law lien ~o as to enable a bailee to retake property which has gone out of his 
possession and enforce his lien upon it. Donkey engines and automobiles 
:µid gasoline and many other things that are repaired or furnished these 
days did not exist at common law, and do not take kindly to the pollsession 
requirement. The lien must keep pace with progress. 
BAN.KllUPTCY-ASSIGNKENT 01 WACF.S UNA~ BY DISCHilG!.-ln a 
S:uit to reform an assignment of wages to be earned in the future given by an 
employe of defendant to complainant to seture a note for borrowed money, it 
was contended that a discharge in bankruptcy granted to ~e assignor, in a 
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proceeding initiated after the assignment and loan, had rendered the assign-
ment thereafter ineffective. Held, the assignment was not rendered unen-
forceable by the discharge, the lien created by such transaction survives the 
bankruptcy proceeding. Monarch Discount Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry Co., 
(Ill., 1918) 120 N. E. 743. 
In its conclusion the court is supported by an earlier Illinois case, };! allin 
v. Wenham, 209 Ill. 252, and Citizens 1.onn .A.ss'n v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 
1g6 Mass. 528, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1025. In Leitch v. Northern Pacific Rail-
WaY Co., 95 Minn. 35, it was held that the assignment of wages to be earned 
created no lien, therefore there was nothing to survive the discharge of the 
principal obligation. In Levi v. Loevenhart & Co., 138 Ky. 133. an order by an 
employee by his employer to pay out of his wages each week a certain sum to 
a creditor was held valid only "so long as the indebtedness to plaintiff remain-
ed unsatisfied," and that since the debt .upon which the payments were to ap-
ply was discharged by the employee's discharge in bankruptcy the order had 
spent its force at that time. Discharge in bankruptcy was deemed equiva-
lent to payment. In several cases District Courts have held such wages earn-
ed after the bankruptcy were released from all claim by the assignee, the usual 
ground for the conclusion being that until the wages were earned there could 
be no lien, hence none was preserved. In re ·West, 128 Fed. 205; In re Home 
Discount Co., 147 Fed. 538; In re Karns, 148 Fed. 143; In re Ludeke, 171 Fed. 
292; In re Lineberry, 183 Fed. 338. 
CoNTRACTS-THIRD PARTY BtN£FICIARY.-Upon a promi~e by defendant's 
testate to make a certain provision in his will for his wife's niece the wife 
signed a will in which the bulk of her property, a house and lot, was devised 
to the promisor for life, remainder over to a certain society. The promisor 
died without having made any provision as agreed upon, and the niece brought 
suit on the promise, claiming in damages the value of the house which her 
aunt had intended should go to her. Held, (H1scocK, C. J. and Cot.I.IN and 
ANDGSON, J. J. dissenting) plaintiff could maintain the action. Seaver v. 
Ransom, (N. Y. 1918) 120 N. E. 639. 
At the outset the court, speaking through POUND, J., declared that de-
fendant's testate was not a trustee-"Beman was bound by his promise, but 
no property was bound by it; no trust in.plaintiff's favor can be spelled out." 
In the very l~t sentence of the opinion, after discussing the doctrine of Law-
rence v. FJJr, 20 N. Y. 268, and the later New York cases applying that doc-
trine, the court said: "The equities are with the plaintiff, and they may bC 
enforced in this action, whether it be regarded as an action for damages or an 
action for specific performance. to convert the defendants into trustees for 
plaintiff's benefit under the agreement." In the reaction against Lawrence v. 
For limitations were placed upon the doctrine. allowing third parties to sue 
that were illogical and in many respects unfortunate. If an action by a third 
party-creditor is to be allowed, it would seem a f orliori that the same 
privilege should be extended to a donee-beneficiary, for in this class of cases 
th~ resulting difficulties in denying the action are palpably greater than in the 
former class. The New York Court, however, announced the doctrine that the 
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third party could not sue unless the promisee owed the third party beneficiary 
some "legal or equitable duty" which would be satisfied by performance of the 
promise. D1m1herr v. Rav, 135 N. Y. :n9. This would seem to eliminate 
donee-beneficiary. However, the existence of a moral duty was· deemed 
sufficient. BtKlumcm v. Tilde111 158 N. Y. 109. Even though such duty would 
not be satisfied by performance. In the principal case PouND, J., said he could 
not "reconcil~ a decision in favor of tlie wife in Buchanan v. Tilde11, based 
on the moral obligations arising . out of near relationship, with a decision 
against the niece here on the ground that the relationship is too remote for 
equity's ken." Apparently the New York court is nearly prepared to say·that 
if one thinks enough of another to make a gift there is sufficient "moral obli-
gation" to bring the case within the rule. That of course would be equivalent 
to recognizing that the requirement of any sort of "obligation" in these cases 
is out of place. See 15 Hilv. L. R!v. 767; Z., YAU L. JoUR. roo8. 
CoRPO:RATioNs :-PoWEJt or ATTOKNt.Y. 'fO Sw. SJLU!s LIMITED 'fO On 
STAT!, INCLUDING POWER 'fO Sw. SHAUS IN A c0eoRATION INCOU'O:RAT!D JN 
ANOTH!tR STAT!, OWNING hoPGTY JN Tmt FoRMU STATt.-Plalntiff 
was the beneficial owner of shares in a corporation incorporated iii 
Maine, to own and operate mines in Nevada, with offices in Boston, MaSsa-
chusetts. Plaintiff and N had originally owned -the mining property which 
had been transferred by .them to the corporation in exchange for part· of i~ 
stock, which, with other parts, was put in trust with B under a pooling agree-
ment. The company became financially emba"rrassed and a controversy 
arose between plaintiff, N, and the· company as to whether the mining property 
might not revert to N and the plaintiff. The mining operations had been 
practically suspended, and plaintiff had gone. to. Calgary, Alberta; N had 
brought suit against the company in his own name, and had had a conference 
with the attorney of the company looking to a settiement of bis and the plain-
tiff's claims against it. Plaintiff was notified by N of the situation and under 
these circumstances plaintiff gave N a power of attorney to demand and re-
ceive sums due plaintiff "for or in respect of any shres, stock, or interest, 
which I may now or hereafter hold in any corporation," and "to sell and abso-
lutely dispose of such shares," and "to act in relation to my estate and effects, 
real and personal" as fully as if personally present myself, but "this power of 
attorney to cover the sta'te of Nevada only." . N, under this power, sold plain-
tiff's interest iri his shares in this Maine. corporation, and plaintiff brings his 
. bill to have the shares returned to hiJD, on the ground the shares were not 
located in Nevada. HeliJ: bill dismissed. Wanser v. BroWJI, (Mass. 1918), 
121. N. E. 6g. 
The court; by Rucc, C. J., says that the limitation in the power of attorney 
indicates that it "is to be exercised as to property either physically 10cated 
within that state or deriving its value from ownership of property pbysicallv 
located" therein. The court recognizes that generally, the property of the 
shareholder in bis shares is distinct from the property of the corporation, and 
the sitvs of shares is at the residence of -the owner, or at the domicile of the 
corporation, yet in a remote sense a certificate of stock is "an interest in the 
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property of the corporation, which might be in other states than either the 
corporation ·or. the certificate of stock," citing Hatch v. Reardorc (1907), 204 
U. S. 1,52, 161. This holds that -the New York two cent stamp tax on the 
transfer of certificates of stock which are actually present in New York is not 
unconstitutional, because the corporation or its property is located.elsewhere, 
and the court said the "immediate object of sale was the certificate of stock; 
* * * in a remote sense, the membership or share which the certificate made 
attainable; * * * more remotely still, an interest in the property of the corpora-
tion," yet this does not make the sale a transaction of interstate or foreign 
commerce, even if the c0rporation is, and the seller and buyer reside, out of 
the state." 
The court,. however, concludes that in this case, "a fair interpretation" of 
the terms of the power of attorney made it effective "respecting all properties 
which derive their value from real or personal estate located within the state 
of Nevada," whether owned directly, or indirectly through stock ownership in 
a corporate owner. This seems to be a rather forced construction, and greatly 
stretches the quotation from the Hatch case above. Nothing but the circum-
~ces surrounding the transaction can justify the decision, if that is suffi-
cient. 
Da:Ds-DEl.tvav-MANUAI. TliNsl£1l TO GRAN'IU UNNtCESsnv.-When 
defendant was six years old and living with K as a member of his family a 
deed of certain land was prepared by K and placed in bis safe in an envelope 
indorsed in defendant's name. Defendant had access to this safe .from child-
hood. There was evid~e that K had declared that the land was defend-
ant's, that be, K, was O{l]y an .overseer, and that he had acquiesced in acts of 
ownership by defendant. One witness testified ·that K told him to go after 
K's death to the safe with defendant and take out the papers, one addressed 
to witness and one to defendant. The ·will of K did not purport specifically 
to dispose of the land descn"bed in the deed. In an action of ejectment by K's 
heirs it was held that th.e deed to defendant had been delivered. Kanawell v. 
Miller (Pa., 1918) 104 Atl. 861. 
Undoubtedly courts are coming to appreciate more and mote that delivery 
·does not depend upon any particular formality, that a deed has been delivered 
whenever there is satisfactory proof that the maker has evinced his intention 
that the instrument shall be as to him a completed legal act. See 16 MICH. L 
Rmo. s8o. et seq., and Profesoor H. T. Tiffany in 17 MICH. L Rmo., 103, et. seq. 
Obviously an actual handing over of the document to the grantee or to some 
third party for the grantee is of the very best sort of evidence to show such 
intention. Howev~r, such a transfer if the requisite intention is lacking is 
not necessatily a delivery, See .Cv"Y. v. Colbuns, 99 Wis.·319; Tewksbury v. 
Tewk~bu,,,,, 222 .Mass. 5rj5:· Normally a deed. which has remained under the 
physical control or in the possession of the. maker has not become operative 
for lack of delivery, but there are many cases wherein, as ·in the princi)!.al .ca.sc, 
the courts have. found .sufficient evidence of the necessary intention9despite 
such contin,ucd control or possession. See the many cases cited in note 8, 17 
MICH. L. ~- 105. 
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Eu:cnoNs-NoN-CoNsTITU'tIOHAL OFFICES-Wo:u.:N.-The Constitution of 
North Dakota limited the elective franchise to ~e persons. Held, that this 
does not preclude the legislature from authorizing women to vote for village 
officers who are created by it since the legislature has plenary powers to regu-
late the affairs of municipalities. Spatgers v. O'Neil el aL, (N. D. 1918), ltig 
N. W.491. . 
The court refused to express an opinion whether women could vote for all 
non-constitutional officers but it suggested that it believed in the affirmative. 
The decision is confined to cases arising in the regulation of local government. 
In Belles v. B11rr, 76 Mich. l, 'Y'here the legislature was entrusted with the 
creation of school districts women could vote in school elections, but See 
Coffin v. Kennedy, 97 Mich. ~88. Women were allowed to vote on matters· of 
public improvement in Spit•er v. Village of .Ffllton, 172 N. Y. 285. There is 
some authority to the contrary. In People ex rel. Van Bakkelen v. Carsaday, 
73 N. C. 198, the legislature could not change the period of resiilence "of city 
electors since the Constitution applied to all elections-which was construed to 
include general and local elections. In Board ·of Election Commissioners of 
the City of Indianapolis el al. v. Knight (Ind.), 117 N. E. s6S. the court hCtd 
that the description in the Constitution desigllating who are entitled to vote 
is exclusive of all others, on the principle th:.t expressio 11nitu est excltlsio 
alteritu. See also State es rel. AUison v. Blake, 57 N. J. L 6. But in 5'cottm 
v. Czarnecki, 264 111. 305, LR. A. 1915 B, 247, the court went farther than the 
principal holding and decided that the legislature could extenil the suffrage to. 
women in all cases of election of non-constitutioJlal -officers. The court rea5-
oned that the power of the legislature is unlimited except as restricted ex-
pressly or impliedly by the Constitution; hence the vote could be extended 
without regard to constitutional limitations in matters wholly without the 
constitutional sphere. This conclusion does not seem any less logical than the 
conclusion reached in the ptitJcipal case. 
GoonwIU. oF A REAL EsTA'n: AND LoAN BuSINESs.-Ellsworth and Jenkins 
agreed to dissolve their partncrshiP as dealers in real eState and loan!. Jen-
kins continued to act as liquidating partner for four years, to the time of his 
death. After .his death his administrator, Macfadden, the widow of Jenkins 
and a clerk formed the Ellsworth-Jenkins Company to deal in.real estate, and 
took over the old business. Mrs. Jenkins claimed· that the goodwill of the 
Ellsworth and Jenkins firm should be .reckoned as worth $4500 to the. new 
company. Held, that the goodwill should have been acco~ted for as an asset 
of the decedent's estate, and as worth that sum, (N. Dale. 1918), 169 N. W. 
ISL - . . 
This decision shows an encouraging tendency of the eourts ·to get '?-way 
from the a priori method of reasoning by starting from a fixed definiti0n and 
attempting to bring the facts of the case within the definitioo in ordCr to de-
termine the rights of the Parties. The court begins. in the time honored Wai 
by citing various definitions including of course Lord Eldon's in Cn11"11iill v. 
Lye, 17 Ves. 335, 346, that "good will*** is n~ing more than the probabiiity 
that the old customers will resort to the old place." The court shows the in-
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sufficiency of this and cites other definitions that improve upon it, but then, in 
place of making another definition under which the present set of facts might 
be brought, the court goes straight to the heart of the matter by saying that 
"The law as other big institutions of modern society, is advancing. It has 
broadened in its conception of human rights, including property rights." It 
concludes that we have here a property right of value and that the value 
has been assessed by the lower court at the right amount. By thus turning 
from the rule of law to "the simple question of the rigl).t of the party claimant 
the court arrives at a correct conclusion by a perfectly simple process avoiding 
all the pitfalls of the logical syllogism with its possible errors arising from a 
divided middle and incidentally also avoids the enunciation of another defini-
tion of goodwill with which to trouble us. 
INJUNCTION-SALE oF BusINtss-AGR!tKENT NOT TO CoMP£Tt.-D sold his 
business and good will to A and, as part of the consideration, agreed that he 
would not "directly or indirectly enter into business in Sioux Rapids, Iowa, in 
competition with" A for five years. A sold the business and good will to P 
to whom A assigned the "contract" with D. D re-entered business in compe-
tition with P. Bill by P to restrain D from entering into competition with 
him in violation of the agreement. Held: Injunction should be granted. 
Sickles et al. v. Lauman, (Iowa, 1918) 16g N. W. 670. 
The defendant contended that the contract gave to A a mere personal 
right which could not be assigned to P, the second purchaser of the business. 
This argument bad no weight with the court; for the question had been al-
ready settled in Iowa. Hodge, Elliot & Co. v. Lowe, 47 Iowa 137. This is 
in accord with the views. of nearly all courts. As was well said in Francisco v. 
Smith, 143 N .. Y. ·488; "such an agreement is a yaluable right in connection 
with the business it is designed to protect and going with the business it 
may be assigned and the assignee may enforce it just as the assignor could 
have enforced it, if· he had retained the business. The agreement could have 
no independent existence or vitality aside from the business." Even if the 
covenant or agreement had not been assign~, the assignee (purchaser) of the 
business would be entitled to enforce it. American Ice Co. v . .Merkel, vog App. 
Div •• 93; Fleckmstein v. Fleckinstei1t-, (N. J. Ch.) 53 Atl. 1043. Conveyancing 
forms do not permit a covenant to be made with a business, but such is the 
intent of the parties. The purpose is to give; additional value to the business 
sold; and as the covenant is designed primarily to protect the business sold 
it ought to 'run' with the business. In fact it seems preferable to treat such 
a covenant as an equitable servitude. 
Lma.,-Palm1002, Exa:ss, PUBLICATION TO A Ci.nx.-Under an agreement 
between defendants and M:; the latter selected plaintiff, Roff, as an arbitrator. 
Defendants then wrote M, "We decline to accept a man with the German 
name of Roff .as arbitrator." The letter was sent in the usual way by post to 
M, where it was opened by one of M's clerks, who placed it upon the desk 
of another clerk, who gave it to M. Plaintiff w~s not a German at all, and 
on learning of the facts, sued the defendants for libel, in the publication to M. 
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Defendants pleaded privilege, and the jury found there was no malice in the 
publication to M. The trial court ruled that "the publication to the clerks 
was not privileged, even if the writing to" M was, and judgment was enter-
ed for the plaintiff. On appeal by defendants, held: the publication to M was 
prima facie privileged, and this privilege, in the absence of malice, is not lost 
by the publications to the clerks. Roff v. British a11d Frmch Chemical Co., 
(Court of Appeal, K. B. D., Nov. 1918), 87 L J. R. (K. B.), 996. 
SWINF£N EADY, M. R., held that since both defendants and M had a com-
mon interest in the selection of an arbitrator, the occasion. was Prima f acie 
privileged, unless there was malice to rebut the prima facie protection,· and the 
jury had negatived any malice. The other judges agreed. It was further ar-
gued that the mere fact that a defamatory communication, prima facie privi-
leged, is communicated to a third person having no interest, is in excess of 
the privilege and destroys it. But the court held otherwise, relying on the 
eases of Pt1llma11 v. Hill, (d!9I), l Q. B. 524; Edmondson v. Birch, (1907), l 
K. B. 37l, and others reviewed in note in 17 MICH. L. Ru. 187. 
All the judges held that the action was not for a publication to the clerks, 
but only to M, and hence the trial justice's instructions that the publication to 
the clerks was not privileged, was not applicable and was misleading. They 
seemed to think that a separate action might possibly have been maintained 
for the publication to the clerks. This matter is covered in the note in the 
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Puwc UTrums OPERATING Arn:& ExPDtATlON oP F'RANcHis!-ORDINANcit 
FIXING RAtts.-A street railway company furnished the exclusive service to 
defendant city. On 150 miles of the lines the franchises had expired, 65 miles 
were under a "three-cen~ franchise," and SS mites of disconnected sections of 
tracks in outlying streets were under "five-cent franchises," which had not yet 
expired. The city on August 9, l9I8, passed an ordinance in terms amendable 
·or repeatable at any time, limiting fares that might be charged on franchise 
lines to franchise rates, and on non-franchise lines to a maximum of five 
cents. The ordinance expressly provided that it should not be ·construed to im-
pair the obligation of any valid contract. The Supreme Court of the United 
States found the enforcement of the ordinance on the averments of the bill, 
which for the purposes of the hearing must be taken to be true, would result 
in a deficit to the company. The rates fixed did not provide a reasonable re-
turn, and therefore deny to the company due process of law. The District , 
Court should have granted a temporary injunction and proceeded to a hear-
ing and determination of the case. Detroit Utsited Railway v. City of Detroit, 
United States Supreme Court, No. 666, January 13, 1919. 
Little need be added to what was said on the Dmver Water Case, 246 
U. S. 178, in 16 Mica. L Ru. 438. The case simply follows that case, and from 
this three justices dissent, as they did in that case. The only difference be-
tween the two seems to be ~t in the Detroit case the company has certain 
unexpired franchises, so that the city is not free to operate a complete system 
of its own by driving the company from the streets, and the company is on 
the non-franchise streets only by sufferance. The court has constructed a 
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situation of the man and the bear at grips, and neither can let go beeause 
each has to have the other. Meantime the bear docs not seem to be suffering, 
since the courts forbid the man to do anything to kill mm, or even to prevent 
his having plenty of sustenance, provided always he will not be too hard on 
the man. The court will umpire the contest, but it seems to remain a per-
petual draw, which worries the city but is at most a slight annoyance to the 
company. 
RAtLR.OADS-INJURJES AT CaossINc-STATIONARY GoNc-CoNnIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE-QUESTION FOR THE ]URY.-The plaintiff Guest and his automo. 
bile were injured in a collision with the defendant's passenger "train at a cross-
ing. There was evidence tending to show that the automatic stationary electric 
gong failed to ring as the train approached; that the plaintiff failed to stop, 
look, or listen before attempting to cross; that a signboard partially obstructed 
his view of the track. Held, that the question of contributory negligence ~s 
for the jury even though the plaintiff failed to stop, look and listen-if the au-
tomatic gong failed to ring. Bsuh v. Brewer et al., (Ark. 1918), 206 S. W. 322. 
The failure to sound the stationary gong created an exception to the gen-
eral rule that where a traveler docs not use his senses to guard his own safe-
ty the question is purely one of law for the court. It became a question for. 
the jury to decide whether the plaintiff was actually negligent in failing to 
look and listen for approaching trains while behind the signboard, since the 
silence was in a measure an invitation to the public to cross. The dissenting 
views admitted that the opening of a gate.operated by~ flagman is an invita-
tion to cross but insisted that there is no such invitation when a gong fails to 
ring sin~ such contrivances are known to be out of repair frequently. The 
courts arc by no means agreed as to the effect of a reliance on the absence of 
customary warning signals situated at crossings. The principal case is sup-
ported by Tobias v. Railroad Co., 103 Mich. 330, where the question was left 
to the jury even though it was clear from the evidence that the plaintiff could 
have seen the train had he looked. But other cases hold that the question is 
still for the court if the traveler has failed to stop, look and listen; the failure 
of the automatic gong to ring does not jus!]fy any relaxation of vigilance. 
Conkling v. Erie R.R. Co.,.63 N. ]. L 338; Jacobs v. Railway Co. <:fl Kansas 
247; McSweeney v. Erie R.R. Co., 87 N. Y. Supp. 836. The conflict appears 
· also among the gate cases. In K-0ch v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 14B Cal: 677 the 
court declared that the traveler could rely on the raising of the gates but that 
he had to look and listen nevertheless; otherwise he could not recover as a 
matter of law-"he must show more as to his conduct than that he so relied." 
The clissenting opinion ·in the-California case cited many cases to prove that 
the raising of the gates was an invitation ·to cross ·and that this was enough 
to make a jury question. Geoffroy v. New York N. H. & H. R. ·co., (R. I. 
1918), 104 Atl. 883 decided last month, is in accord with the theory of the 
principal case but it adds a qualification which the principal ease did not have 
to consider. The Rhode Island court admitted that the opening of the gates 
brought the question to the jury even though the plaintiff did not stop, look, 
and listen where it was possible that he exercised due care notwithstanding; 
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such failure to use bis senses-the location of the gates whether in a city or 
in the country, the presence or absence of traffic on the highway, the presence 
of obstructions or the presence of the gatcman arc all circumstances which 
might call for a reliance on the signal without resorting to other precautions; 
but where the evidence clearly showed that he could have seen the train had 
he used his senses the question was for the court as a matter of law. This 
last case seems to meet the situation satisfactorily since it allows no undue 
relaxation of vigilance but at the same time recognizes the psychological clc-
~ent-the apparent invitation-where it is a controlling motive in causing 
the traveler to cross. The distinction raised by the dissenting view in the 
principal case is a technical one but not ;i real one. It discovers a difference 
in causes but no difference in effects. Whether the controlling agency of the 
device is a human being or a contrivance is immaterial so long as it can be 
shown that the psychological effect may be the same-that the traveler there-
by actually becomes "less cautious in looking for the coming of a train." 
SP£Ct1Ic PtRl'ORKANCS-MuTUALlTY or REKm>Y.-A employed B, an attor-
ney at law, to represent b~ in certain actions in which be (A) was involved. 
As consideration for services rendered it was agreed that, on the final deter-
mination of the actions, A should tum over to B certain shares of stock. B 
performed the services, but A refused to carry out bis part of the agreement. 
Bill by B for specific performance. Defense: want of mutuality of remedy. 
Helcl: Specific performanc;c decreed. Roche et al. v. Maclar el al.; (Wash. 
1918) 175 Pac. 314-
Mutuali!)t of remedy continues to raise its bead with the persistence of 
Banquo's ghost. It would seem clear that it has no application to a unilateral 
contract nor to a bilateral contract fully performed on one side. WlJ.ile it is 
true that equity would not compel B to perform personal services .for A, yet 
the authorities are practically unanimous that, when B has performed the 
services, he may compel A to perform. Such a result seems inevitable; for 
it would be most unjust if A who has already received the promised equivalent 
for his performance, were permitted to plead that he could not have com-
pelled the performance be has received. Yet the uniformly unsuccessful at-
tempts of .parties in such a situation to resist performance indicate confusion 
in the mibds of many lawyers as to the real meaning of mutuality. The final 
word on the subject has been spoken by Ames. Mutuality in Specific Perform-
ance, 3 Col. Law Rev. I; Lectures on Legal History, 370. Cf. Pomeroy, 
Contracts (ed. 2) § § 162-174-
TR!sPASSING CHW>-LIABIUTY FOil NECr.lGJtNct Tow.ux>.-Defendant left 
his automobile standing at the proper place near the curb on a street, while 
be was gone about twenty minutces. On bis return be found the plaintiff, a 
small boy about four and one-half years old, with several other small chil-
dren, upon the right band running board of his car, near the curb. They 
asked for a ride. Defendant refused this and drove them away. He then 
cranked his car, got in it on the left-band side, noticing that the plaintiff 
was then on the left-hand running board. The car had a right-band drive. 
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There was conflict in the testimony at this point, defendant claiming he had 
"shoved" plaintiff away a short distance before starting his car, and did n~t 
know he was on the running board at the time. Plaintiff's testimony was to 
the effect that he had remained on the running board, until he was thrown 
off by the starting of the car. Defendant asked the court to instruct the jury 
that he would be liable only if he knew plaintiff was on the running board 
when he started, and, after he drove him away (if the jury so found) he 
was under no further dnty toward him for neglecting to investigate to find 
out if he was upon the running board. This request was denied. The court 
instructed that defendant was bound to know a child of such age might act 
upon a childish imJ:lulse, and if he was so close to the car, when it wq 
started, and his conduct such as to lead a prudent man to believe he was . 
about to jump upon the car, you have a right to inquire what ordinary care 
and prudence required of the defendant under the circumstances. Defendant 
excepted to this instruction. Judgment for the plaintiff by the trial court 
was reversed by the Court of Appeals, and this was reversed by the Supreme 
C:o11rt of Ohio. Ziel:m v. VcJle (Ohio, 1918), 120 N. E. 102- · 
The Court of .r'.ppeals relied upon two earlier cases, Railroad Co. v. Har-
vey, and Swartz v. Akrt:JJ Water Works Co. (1907), 'J7 O. S. 235. The Har-
vey case was on«- in which a boy five or six years old was injured while 
swinf!'ing on nn unenclosed, unlocked, and easily accessibte railroad turn-
table. in a vitlage where children were known to be m the habit of playing. 
The Akrors case was onc·in which a small girl was drowned by falling into 
the water works reservoir situated on a high hill partly in the city, where 
people resorted frequently to enjoy the view,-the reservoir being surrounded 
by a picket fence three feet high, through a hole in which, due ·to t11e loss 
of two pickets, the small girl and two others climbed, and the former fell 
down the steep inside bank into deep water and was dro\Vned. Judgments 
for plaintiffs in both cases were obtained which were reversed for error in 
overruling the defendants' motions for directed verdicts. "The distinction 
between the legal duty due uninvited persons, in cases arising from the con-
stri1ction of the premises, and in those arising from their negligent operation, 
is clearly made", according to the court, in C. H. & D. R. R. v. Aller, 64 
O. S. 1R3, and is made the basis of the decision in the Ziehni case above. 
WANA!.UKER, J., in concurring, registers a vigorous protest against the im-
plied approval of the Har:vey case, saying it asto,nished the profession, and 
indicated the high water mark of the court" in its effort to magnify property 
right and minimize personal right,-the right to life, limb, health, and safe-
ty-especially when applied to a child 4~ years of age!' The distinction be-
tween active and passive negligence in similar cases, on· which the Ziehm 
case is based, is fairly well established, but admittedly difficult of application. 
See Fitzpatrick v. Glass Mfg. Co. (1898). 61 N. J. L. 378. and Gallagher v. 
Jlumf'hres (1862), 6 L. T. R., N. S. 684. The turntable cases arc in hopeless 
conflict, as shown in the Haroey case where an effort is made to classify them. 
